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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, a sensor fusion inspired system architecture for network security is
presented. A protocol for the architecture is presented which is flexible, secure, and uses
very little system resources.

The message format, actions taken upon receipt and

sequence of messages are all defined for the protocol.

A sample application was

developed to implement six of the messages: Hello, Introduce, Validate, Search, Block
IP, and Goodbye. These six messages provide the core behavioral framework for the
protocol.
Many of the· current intrusion detection systems (IDS) are designed to only
monitor a single host, or a single network. Many of these IDS have been evaluated in
efforts such as the DARPA MIT-Lincoln Lab IDS evaluations of 1998 and 1999. Most
of these systems performed with various degrees of success depending on the mode and
originality of the attacks.
This architecture is designed to be independent of developments in intrusion
detection (ID) and firewalling systems by providing an additional layer of defense. This
additional layer doesn't detect the attack; it communicates the attack to the neighboring
network so that defensive actions can be taken by the network as a whole not just the
host. This technique of fusion would allow IDS that have ''marginal" success rates to
combine its output with the output of additional local or remote detection systems and
create a more successful judgement of the attack. This information could then be acted
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upon by the whole network of nodes, iri the form of firewalling or other mechanism, and
not just the victim host.
Testing showed that the application was able to detect attacks that originate on the
Internet or on the local network and actively request and block the attacking IP closest to
the source. This eliminates the route on which the attacking packets can pass, thus
protecting the network. Additional in field-testing is still needed due to the limitations of
the test bed.
Future possible uses and expansions of the protocol are presented. Some of these
possible expansions include: traffic throttling of attackers, requests for deeper forensic ID
analysis, and warning of "spoofed" packets.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction

Envision a mighty medieval castle high atop a hill. A fortress made of
impenetrable stone, armed with teams of guards and mighty ballista. Now add streams of
attacking hordes coming across the neighboring kingdoms to assault this lone castle.
This grim situation is similar to the environment machines face when they are connected
to modem computer networks. Security administrators work long hours to insure their
systems are fortified in a manner similar to the medieval castle. By keeping their
operating systems patched and up to date, they continually strengthen and reinforce the
defensive walls. By fine tuning the local firewalls, routers, hosts, they insure that the
approaches are well guarded. Unfortunately, determined attackers are almost always able
to find the weaknesses in any stand-alone defense strategy, overrun the "castle," and
. claim their reward, not of silver and gold, but of information. The stand-alone nature of
the defense strategy also allows most attackers· to escape retaliation, because tracking the
source of most attacks after they occur is difficult due to the inherently open, trusting
nature of modem day network protocols.
This "one network against a thousand attackers" mindset needs to be revised to
provide protection from increasingly sophisticated attacks. Just as the lords and ladies of
medieval times realized they must form strategic alliances to enhance the security of their
fiefdoms, now so should those that administer computer networks.
1

Through the

development and implementation of a common defense strategy in which the sovereignty
of individual networks is maintained, locally connected networks could help each other
ward off the barbarian hordes of modern day crackers, helping to cut the high cost of
recovery from repeated sieges.
Current state-of-the-art intrusion detection and firewall systems use a combination
of rule matching, statistical analysis, and state transition analysis to detect attacks.
However, no matter how sophisticated, none are perfect at detecting or protecting against
all known forms of attack. As new attacks emerge, the rules and state progression must
be updated to deal with the new threat, and until that is done, are fairly weak against such
attacks.
The work presented in this thesis focuses on the development of a system
architecture and communication protocol for such a cooperative defense system that
insures flexibility, scalability, security, and efficiency. This architecture is designed to
use sensor fusion techniques to improve the detection rate of attacks across the network
and issue requests for defensive action in order to thwart attackers.

1.1

Traditional Approaches to Intrusion Detection (ID)

There are currently two predominant types of intrusion detection systems, host
based {HIDS) and network-based {NIDS). HID systems are the equivalent of castle
walls.

They are deployed on individual machines, and are designed to combine

information about the activities of users and machine-specific network traffic to
recognize and possibly defend against attacks. NIDs monitor the traffic on individual
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networks, keeping and eye out for abnormal or unexpected behaviors, and thus serve as
guardians of the approach.
Host-based ID systems were the first to be developed and are still the type most
commonly found deployed on the networks today. This form of intrusion detection has a
lower false positive rate than NIDS, but scales poorly, since each machine on a given
network must be constantly maintained. In addition, most HID systems are usually not
deployed to provide real-time protection from attacks, but are used for forensic analysis
and source tracking afterwards.
Network-based ID systems are deployed to scan network traffic for signs of
intrusions of other malicious behavior, and disrupt attacks by through the real-time
control of network access points. Using NID allows a single application to monitor the
network traffic directed at many different simultaneously. Thus, NID systems provide
for real-time defense of all the computers on a local network, and are generally more
scalable, but tend to have higher false positive detection rates due to the volume of traffic
to which they must respond.
Many network administrators use a combination of HIDS and NIDS in order to
provide both scalability and to reduce the number of false alarms. NID systems are used
to rapidly detect, log, and possibly interrupt attacks, while HID systems are used to verify
their findings and provide additional information that can later be used to track the source
of the unwanted behavior.
Various techniques and methods [1,2] are used by both HID and NID platforms to
identify attacks and are implemented in a variety of software packages. Five common
methods are used currently for intrusion detection [3]: known patterns or templates
3

matching, threatening behavior templates matching, network traffic analysis, statistical
anomaly detection of packets and file access, and state-based detection of packets and
system commands. These techniques provide the core for many of the current intrusion
detection applications.
Systems that employ behavior templates for detection attempt to match patterns of
file access� program execution, and user logins to known attack methodologies. For
example, such systems might watch for attempts to e-mail password files (which could
later be cracked usi11:g brute force on a remote �acliin�), an� ·either log or block such
behavior. An example of one such application is Eye on Exec (EOE)[4]. EOE monitors
processes for unwanted behavior patterns, and takes various steps ranging from logging
the suspicious behavior to stopping the offending process. Pattern matching techniques
are excellent for detecting attacks in real-time with low false alarm rates. However, they
must be constantly updated to recognize new attack strategies, and operate in complete
isolation.

This need for constant updates make them expensive to maintain and

susceptible to human�error related vulnerabilities.
ID systems that use traffic analysis evaluate packets as they enter a local network,
and analyze packet structures based on strict or fuzzy rule-sets. This method forms the
core of most NID systems. A popular NID system in wide use today is called Snort[5].
Snort uses a set of rules to analyze the contents of received packets and identify

irregularities.

As an example, Snort is able to detect the specialized NMAP[6] probe

based on analysis of the packet contents, classify it as hostile, and record all relevant
information (sender, protocol used, time, etc.) for later forensic analysis. This method of
detection is very good in that it allows a large number of heterogeneous machines to be
4

pr?tected by observing the flow of packets into and out of the network. One problem
with this method however is the rate of false positives that could be generated. Since
there is such a large number of possible attacks, and various peaks in network traffic and
loading, some packets may be improperly classified as malicious by this sort of system.
The false alarm rate however can usually be reduced through improved rule sets or ·
firewall rules to limit traffic flow on the network.

However, the rules used for this

method must also be kept up to date for each of the systems for them to be effective.
Statistical-anomaly based ID systems use mathematical methods to check
behaviors against what is "normal" for a local network.

Such systems excel at

recognizing sudden activity on rarely-used ports - a trait which is indicative of a system
breach where an attacker is attempting to access unauthorized services. Many of the
newer ID applications perform anomaly detection in conjunction with other techniques to
improve recognition performance and reduce false alarm rates.

Examples of such

systems are the Statistical Packet Anomaly Detection Engine (SPADE)[7] preprocessor
for Snort, Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES)[8], or JiNao[9].
The primary difficulty in employing such a method stems from the large amount of
training data required for systems or networks that have widely varying usage patterns.
Most statistical-anomaly based systems are, however, able to generate a set of "normal"
traffic patterns for comparison given sufficient time and training data. Once this basis set
of modeled activities is found, ID system using statistical methods are able to accurately
detect a wide range of suspicious activities. Such system could also be made self
adapting although few have investigated this potential ability to date.
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ID systems that rely on state-based detection look at the sequence of events that
are occurring on the system, and try to match them to known attacks. One such system
would see that the root password was failed multiple times, then succeede�, then started
to modify essential files, and raise an alert. An example of such a program is STAT[l0].
STAT uses a set of rules to which it compares logs from a host. As it parses a log it notes
certain commands and activities which leads though a series of states from a secure to a
compromised system. It then matches the state of the system to a known set of
penetration scenarios to determine if a system is. in the proce�� of being _c(?mpromised.
Most applications that utilize some type of state-based detection do so in conjunction
with other methods as an auxiliary method of detection. Unfortunately, state-based
detection on HID systems is not performed in real time. Audit trails must be accumulated
and parsed to detect abnormalities. Thus, the attack must in essence be completed before
it is recognizable using state-based methods. Some NID systems use a variant of state
based detection in monitoring for packets that are "out of sequence" in a TCP three way
handshake, or malicious fragments that are out of sequence. This allows them to detect
certain attacks like SYN flooding and other fragmented attacks by means of observing

the state the communication transaction sequence. This sort of detection also requires
significant updating, as new attack forms become known. The state progression for each
of these attacks must be included into the matching database for each system. This sort
of technique is also very time consuming because each possible attack sequence must be
checked against the database for each of the commands in a penetration scenario.
The most significant reported attempts to measure the state-of-the-art within the
ID community were the DARPA Sponsored Intrusion Detection Evaluations of 1998 [11]
6

and 1999 [12], performed at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory. These trials were designed to
test the capabilities of numerous experimental ID systems by exposing them to hundreds
(more than 300 in 1998, and more than 200 in 1999) of attacks of various forms (38
forms in 1998, 54 forms in 1999). These forms would included network probes, remote to
local attacks, user to root exploits, and denial of service (DOS) sieges. In both of the
experimental trials, the participants were given an initial set of training data to train and
calibrate their systems. This data set was generated by inserting the various attacks into a
background traffic resembling the common network usage observed on a typical Air
Force base. The internal traffic was generated using an assortment of Solaris, SunOS,__
Linux, and in 1999 Windows NT machines, while the external traffic was created by
machines running a specialized Linux kernel as to emulate 1000 hosts. The protocols
represented in the background traffic included HTTP, SMTP, POP3, FTP, IRC, Telnet,
X, SQLffelnet, DNS, Finger, SNMP, and Time communications.

This traffic was

generated to emulate a standard workday with lunch breaks,· shift changes, and the like.
The attacks were then dispersed into the network traffic for the evaluation and sent to the
participants.
The participants then tried to analyze, detect, and classify the attacks amongst the
high volume of data. From the results posted, in 1998 the achieved detection rates ranged
from 63% to as high as 93%, with a false alarm rate of 10 per day. The 1999 evaluation
found that participants were able to achieve results as high as 100% for some scenarios,
but all participants completely missed some of the newer attack modes with false alarm
rates ofless than 10 per day.
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This large variation of capabilities leads many researches to question the validity
of the evaluation. Scholarly critics such as McHugh [13] have found fault in some of the
techniques· and procedures used for the evaluation. He cites such things as not knowing
the false alarm rate of the generated data without the attacks, the misleading nature of the
ROC curve applied, the attacker oriented nature of the metrics, and not knowing the
actual topography of the generation network as sources are some items to be taken .into
consideration when attempting to understand the relevance of the outcomes of the
evaluation.
One common limiting factor for most of the ID systems is the need for up dating
the rule or state matching set as new attacks evolve. This requires a significant amount of
time and resources to do on continuous basis, which is required for the rate of which new
attacks are being discovered. This investment of time and resources can carry a very high
financial tag even on medium scaled networks.
This growing rate of attacks leads to the discussion of improved defense
strategies. A single machine c�n do· very little to determine the true address of an
attacker. Many attackers hide their true IP address by a technique called "spoofing". The
spoofed address could be a valid address of another host, thus making it harder to track
down the true source of an attack. But, with a proactive defense plan and distributed
sensors, the attack path can be resolved by physically tracking the route of the attacker.
Two such. systems that have been designed to provide cooperative data analysis
and possible proactive defenses are the Distributed Intrusion Detection System
(DIDS)[14] and Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection (AAFID)[15]. DIDS uses
distributed monitoring and data reduction techniques to perform network intrusion
8

detection as shown in figure 1.1. DIDS is essentially a network of NID systems that
report activity in their local regions back to a central command node. Data is collected
through the means of distributed sensors, one per host, and LAN sensors, one per LAN.
The data generated by the hierarchy of distributed sensors is fed to a central node for
collection and analysis. Through this audit trail, many attacks can be detected so long as
the actions of interest were captured to log. While this architecture is easy to implement
and expand, it relies on a strict hierarchy, thus providing a central point of failure and
vulnerability. The centralized decision structure also means that the sensory nodes have
little control over creating requests or generating system alerts.

Local network

administrators also lose some autonomy by relying completely on central node, which
may or may not be under their control.
AAFID uses a similar approach but extends the idea with decentralized
autonomous software agents as shown in figure 1.2. These agents are reconfigurable
software applications that can take commands from and return data to a centralized
transceiver. The agents can be customized though software that would allow them to act
as either NIDS or HIDS as the need arose and send data to the transceiver for correlation.
Each host on a network could have several agents running with different capabilities,
which would then send data to the transceiver (one per host) which then refines the data
and reports it to a monitor which may or may not be on the host. AAFID however does
have the central point of failure issue that was present in the DIDS system at the monitor
level. If a monitor ceases to work, none of the sensors and transceivers associated with it
can report their data. The reconfigurable nature of automated agents allows for the rapid
updating of all the sensory components of the intrusion detection network.
9
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Host with Sensor

Host with Sensor and LAN monitor

Figure 1.1: DIDS Architecture

Host w/ Transceiver

Host w/ Transceiver

Figure 1.2: AAFID Architecture
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The use of autonomous agents also presents a problem in the fact that malicious
code could possibly be injected into the agent by an attack, thereby causing possible data
corruption at the sensor level. This injected code could also be a form of Trojan horse,
waiting to exploit the system or provide access to an attacker undetected. This sort of
vulnerability tends to make autonomous agents less secure and poorly suited for security
purposes.
Currently proactive defense and detection approaches have been intertwined. By
separating these purposes, development in one field would not effect the behavior of the
other. An example as such would be the layered development of the Internet protocols.
A more human example would be the separation between the intelligence gathering and
defense forces of the military. One branch operates solely to detect threats, and the other
works to neutralize or defend against such threats.

1.2

Research Goal

The main goal of this thesis is to develop a sensor-fusion based architecture and
associated communication protocol by which different networks could cooperatively
defend each other from network attacks by the process of sensor fusion. The system
needs to have the following characteristics:
•

Independent of ID system: By being independent of the ID system, choice of

application and developments in the ID methods would not affect the behavior of the
sensory network.
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• Adaptable: Being able to add and remove components to the sensory network
without disturbing the flow of communication allows for greater scalability and
network structural flexibility.
•

Non-Hierarchical: By being non-hierarchical, there is no central point of failure or

attack for the system, there by increasing the resistance to attacks.
•

Flexible: The system needs to be flexible enough to allow for future developmental

needs as they arise. This growth will allow for additional detection, fusion, and
defense methods to be used.
•

Secure: By being secure, the sensory network knows that it can trust the data it is

receiving from the neighboring nodes. This trust, or lack there of in an attacker's
case, will provide further security of the protocol.
•

Efficient: By using very low bandwidth, the protocol can be implemented and have

minimal effect on network performance.

By using such a system machines on a network can both monitor traffic and respond
to action requests froll?- its neighbors. These sentries can then communicate amongst
themselves and act to stop as well as trace the source of offending behaviors. This can be
compared to neighborhood police that must act quickly without a predefined chain of
command to track and apprehend suspects. A diagram of the proposed system is shown
in figure 1.3. This structure allows messages to be passed amongst any of the hosts on
the sensory network.

12

Host with Senso

Remote LAN ·
Host with Sensor

ost with Sensor
�

Figure 1 .3 : Proposed System Architecture
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The ideal purpose of this architecture is to allow for techniques of sensor fusion to
be applied to network security. With multiple software sensors monitoring and recording
network traffic, they can communicate using this protocol to perform queries for packet
searches from attacking hosts, fuse the responses of their neighbors, and send a request to
the neighbors that the attacking host's path of entry be blocked by use of the firewall.
Future development of the protocol and architecture could allow these sensory nodes to
communicate that a suspicious packet was inbound, such as a packet that has an IP that
doesn't match the subnet from which it came. This technique of address hiding is called
"spoofing" and is a common technique for attackers. By using this protocol, the true
physical path of the packet could be traced and the attacker handled. Another future
possibility is the ability to track packets to their originating MAC address. This would
allow a node to notify an administrator that a machine was attacking, and provide the
administrator with an exact address for him to go to and begin his security process.
The messaging protocol for communication among the various sentry machines must
also be designed with above listed goals in mind. The packet structure is such that
various messages and modes of query could be sent and received by the nodes on the
network. This allows a very flexible message structure to be defined and extended in
future revisions. This protocol also takes into account the need for security. Each packet
has room for a security key or some unique identification that would be specific for each
node. In the _initial implementation presented in this thesis, it is used to verify the sender
of the packet. In future implementations this may be some form of public encryption key
that would be used so that each node could encrypt any messages sent to its neighbors.
14

The traffic introduced by the protocol is very small. Each packet is a UDP packet with a
12-byte payload of the data, which produces very little additional network load, even in
the presence of many neighbors.

1.3 Unique Contributions
The unique contribution of this thesis is a sensor fusion inspired security architecture
and associated communication protocol that allows networks to communicate for a
common defense. The architecture and protocol are scalable, flexible, secure, and
efficient. Also presented is an implementation of the protocol in a program that uses
alerts generated by Snort to send queries and requests to neighbors to have them add the
attacking IP into their firewall to be blocked. An evaluation of this implementation is
also shown in this thesis.

1.4 Organizational Overview
Chapter 2 will discuss the structure and behavior of the protocol. Chapter 3 will cover
the design of a prototype system that implements the protocol, as well as an evaluation of
the system's performance under various network attack situations. Chapter 4 will discuss
how the future implementations of the protocol could be extended and a short conclusion
of the thesis.

15
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Figure 1 .4: Attack route over the Intemet.
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CHAPTER 2
Protocol Design

Using the definition of a protocol set forth by Kurose and Ross [16], a protocol should
define the message format, actions taken on the transmission and/or receipt of the
message, and the order of which the messages are transmitted or received.

In this

chapter, I will discuss the format and structure of the protocol as well as the logic behind
it. Next, I will discuss what sort of actions would be expected from the receipt of the
messages. Lastly, I will discuss the expected order of the messages as well as present a
typical flow of operation.

2.1 Protocol Message Format
This protocol has been designed to utilize the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and
Internet Protocol (IP) message structures. The data payload that is added to the UDP
packet for this protocol is only twelve bytes long. This small data size is intended to keep
the added network load to a minimum. The use of the UDP protocol also allows us to
send the same packet to multiple hosts via broadcasting to the broadcast IP of a subnet.
This will allow for faster transmission of the messages to the neighbors by only using one
message. The UDP protocol is a connectionless protocol, which means that the messages
are not guaranteed to be delivered to the receiving host. While this could be a concern,
the very small nature of the packets works to ensure that the routers or hosts along the
delivery path do not drop the packets.
17

The use of a connectionless protocol also means we avoid the three-way
handshake that is present in other protocols like TCP to ensure delivery. If TCP were to
be used, each time a message was to be sent, the sending host would first have to create a
connection, send a very small data payload, and then destroy the connection. An option in
destroying the connection would be to keep the connection active, but this has the side
effect of consuming system resources. TCP also does not allow the packets to be
broadcast. This means that a host would have to send a message to each host rather than
possibly sending it to a broadcast address of the subnet. This reduction of bandwidth
usage means a lower overall use of system and network resources.
The format of the protocol message packet can be seen in Figure 2. 1; numbers in
parenthesis are the number of bits for each field.

Action (4)

Mode (2)

Unique Identification (26)

Address NBO / Validation Number(32)

Resultant { 1 6)

Index {1 6)

Figure 2. 1: Format of SFNSP Packet
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Action Field: 4 bits
The action field is used for determining the overall nature of the message.
Examples of such would be Hello, Goodbye, Search, Validation, and Block IP.
While only five modes are presented with this initial proposal of the protocol, the
additional bit width is left in tact to allow for future development and expansion of the
action structure. This field is required for proper operation of the protocol.
Mode Field: 2 bits
The mode field is used to set the operating mode of the message. This field
determines if the message is an initial request, or a response. Again, additional modes are
left in place for future development of the protocol. This field is required for the protocol.
Unique Identification Field: 26 bits
This field is used so that each packet sent out will have the hosts unique identifier.
This can be either a unique node identification number or ideally the 26-bit public
encryption key for the sending host. This field is used to uniquely identify and validate
the sender, so if applications wish to do so this field should be set accordingly with either
the unique node ID or public key.

19

Address Field / Validation Number: 32 bits
One use of this field is used to transmit an important address, in network byte
order, to its neighbors. For the initial implementation, this was used to transmit the
attacker's address to be searched for, then later blocked. Additional uses could be to send
the broadcast address of the subnet to neighbors in adjacent subnets, thus allowing -for
faster retransmission of the search requests via broadcast techniques.
A second use of this field is during the validation process. Each time a node is to
be validated a unique number is generated and then sent to the host to be validated. This
helps defend against "play back" scenarios where hackers could try to emulate a node by
just echoing back a log file to the requesting host. This field is required for the protocol.
Resultant Field: 16 bits
This field is used in the acknowledge (ACK) messages of actions such as Search
and Block IP. It is not used, left at zero, currently for other forms of actions. It has no
expected values for the request messages but some future implementations could use it
for additional information for requests (i.e. level of expected compliance). It is used to
convey the level of compliance of search or block request back to the requesting host.
Examples of this could be how well the receiving host was able to add commands to the
firewall, or if the item requested to search for was found.
Index Field: 16 bits
· The index field is used during the Search action. It is left at zero for other action
modes currently. For the ACK message, it is simply echoed from the incoming request
packet. It is used to help the sending host correlate the response with the attack to which
it pertains. This allows for very fast access times into the neighbor data structure because

20

the exact index is known, thus removing the time needed to do a search of the neighbor
data structure for the right host to match the response to.
This overall structure is very compact and flexible.

The proof-of-concept

application implements only six of the possible six-teen possible actions. By using a hello
message is capable of establishing a nodal network structure with neighbors. Using an
introduce message structure, new nodes are informed of previously known nodes, thus
expanding connectivity of the sensor network. Validation messages are used to improve
security by confirming the identity of neighboring nodes. Query messages are used to ask
neighbors about suspicious packets. · Requests
for defensive
actions . . are contained 'in ·
.
.
block messages. Goodbye messages allow a node to gracefully remove itself from the
neighbor network structure. Each of these capabilities will be discussed and explained in
more detail in the following section along with the typical actions associated with each
message.

2.2 Actions Defined by the Protocol
The second essential element in defining a protocol is to establish the actions to
be taken on transmission and/or receipt of the messages. These messages and actions are
to be specialized and unique. This is to remove ambiguity between implementations of
the protocol and allow for a more consistent level of expected behavior from the
neighbors to the messages created by the protocol. For the initial proof-of-concept
application, six actions were defined and used, four had acknowledge (ACK) actions
defined as well.
Message 1: Hello. Used to inform neighbors that a neighbor is now online.
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Message 2: Introduce. Used to inform new nodes of existing neighbors on the
sensory network.
Message 3: Validate. Used to validate the authenticity of a node.
Message 4: Search. Used to request if a neighboring node has seen a particular
packet.
Message 5 : Block IP. Used to request that a neighbor block traffic from a given
IP.
Message 6: Goodbye. Used to inform neighbors that a node is leaving the sensory
network.
These messages were designed to be unique in function and pertain to one aspect
of the protocol. Below I will discuss each of the implemented message structures as well
as the actions associated with them. Action and mode field permutations not specifically
mentioned are left undefined to allow for future development of the protocol.

Message 1 : Hello
Action Field: 0, identifying the message as a hello message.
Mode Field: 0 for.-initial hello message, 1 for acknowledgirig-'a hello message;
Unique Identification Field: Unique Node ID number or public encryption key.
All Other Fields: Set to zero because they are not used for the hello message.
They may be used in future revisions to allow for additional initial parameters,
credentials, or system · specific information (such as OS type or version) to be
exchanged between nodes to better format future requests.
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This message is used when a node comes online to alert the other nodes to its presence.
This is needed so nodes can build up a database of neighbors they can contact for packet
searches or blocking requests.

This message is the essential first step in the

communication process between the nodes. In the proof-of-concept application, the
nodes read a "Node O" from a configuration file. This "Node O" is considered a root node
and is started prior to the other nodes on the network. As hosts come up, they introduce
themselves to the ''Node ·o" who in turn adds them to its known neighbor list and then
uses introduction messages to inform the new node of its neighbors.
Message 2: Introduce
Action Field: 1, identifying the message as an introduction message.
Mode Field: 0 for sending an introduction message.
Unique Identification Field: Unique Node ID number or public encryption key.
Address / Validation Number Field: Address in network byte order, of a known
host other than the recipient.
All Other Fields: Set to zero because they are not used for the introduction.
Message.

This message is used to inform a node of other known nodes that may not see the initial
hello message due to network scope or protocol implementation. This allows nodes to
add hosts to their known neighbor list beyond their own network, thus extending the
range of possible hosts to query and fuse responses. This is used to allow new nodes to
confer with the "Node O" and be notified of the other nodes on the network. After they
begin speaking to other nodes, they are further introduced to more neighbors until,
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ideally, all nodes on the network are aware of every other node. The discovery process
would be limited by the TTL (time to live) of the message packet formed by the
particular application, or by some other form of control developed within the application.
Message 3: Validate
Action Field: 2, identifying the message as an validation message.
Mode Field: 0 for sending initial validation message, 1 for acknowledge
validation messages.
Unique Identification -�ield: Unique Node I_Dmunber or public encryption key.
Address / Validation Number Field: A 32-bit number that is uniquely created for
each validation session.
All Other Fields: Set to zero because they are not used for the validation message.

This message is used to validate the authenticity of a host. For the initial implementation
this was simply a unique random number created for each validation session. This
number is sent to a neighbor, and if the same number is sent back through an
acknowledge message, the neighbor is considered validated. This protocol allows this
number to be encrypted with the unique identification key that is presented in the initial
hello message prior to transmission. If a more robust support structure of a public key
database mechanism were present one could verify that the address of the sending packet
does correspond to the public encryption key included in the unique identification field.
This message helps provide a more secure structure for the protocol by adding a
mechanism to confirm the identity of the sender of the request packets. This additional
security in tum helps deter certain attacks that use methods of "playing back" network
24

traffic by introducing a random factor which changes from session to session, making
previous recordings invalid.

Message 4: Search
Action Field: 3, to denote that it is a search message
Mode Field: 0 for the initial search request, 1 for the response message.
Unique Identification Field: Unique Node ID number or public encryption key.
Address / Validation Number Field: Address wanting to be searched for.
Resultant: 65535 (OxFFFF hex) if the packet was seen, 0 if the packet was not
seen.
Index: An identifier that is used to help speed up the correlation between
responses and attack action items. This is simply echoed from the request to the
response.

This message is used to query the neighbors about suspicious packets. The recipient can
take the sending node's address from auxiliary data provided in the IP packet header to
better formulate the search into the packet record database. The responses from the
queries are correlated to the attacks by use of the index field at the sending node, and then
later used in the fusion process. Additional levels could be presented in the protocol (165534) which could allow additional fusion techniques to be done with this variable
response level. This message is critical for the fusion process so must be implemented by
all applications using this protocol.
Message 5: Block IP
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Action Field: 4, to specify that it is a block message
Mode Field: 0 for the initial request, 1 for the response message.
Unique Identification Field: Unique Node ID number or public encryption key.
Address / Validation Number Field: Address wanting to be blocked.
Resultant: Return code from the system command to add the rule to the firewall (0
usually), or 1 for a failure.
Index: Set to zero, it is unused in this message.

This message is used to request that a specified address be blocked. Most commonly,
this would be done by adding the address to the firewall in such a way that the packets
from the given address are dropped. This in tum removes the host as a possible hop in
the path between the attacking host and the victim host.

Message 6: Goodbye
Action Field: 5, identifying the message as a goodbye message.
Mode Field: 0
Unique Identification Field: Unique Node ID number or public encryption key.
All Other Fields: Set to zero because they are not used for the goodbye message.
This message is used to let neighboring nodes know that a node is going down and to
remove them from the neighbor database. This is needed to allow graceful removal of
nodes as they leave the network.
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2.3 Protocol Message Order
The messages and actions defined in 2.2 comprise the core of this protocol. They
provide a base mechanism for communication between nodes.

Using a series of

greetings, introductions, queries, and requests, underlying security systems can be
utilized across the networks to fuse the intrusion detection and defense efforts into a
solidified initiative.

This chapter will discuss the intended message order for the

protocol.
There are four major sequences of message correspondence. The first is the
introduction and deletion of nodes into the network. This is done by using the hello,
introduce, and goodbye message structures. Figure 2.2 graphically demonstrates the
communication that would be seen between three hosts.

9 Goodbye Message
7 Hello Message

□���

1 Initial Boot
3 Hello ACK

----=--�---+

9 Goodbye Message

5 Hello ACK

6 lntrodce Node 1 Message
1 o Goodbye Message ·

Node O

8 Hello ACK

Figure 2.2: Node Introduction and Deletion Message Sequence
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The sequence presented in figure 2.2 is as follows.
1) Node O boots up and through the configuration file knows that it is the root
node and awaits connections.
2) Node 1 boots up, finds the address of Node O from its configuration file and
sends an initial hello message letting Node O know that it is up and
operational.
3) Node O responds to the hello message with a hello ACK message, and adds
Node 1 to its known list of neighbors. Upon receiving the ACK message,
Node 1 adds Node O to its list of known neighbors.
4) Node 2 boots up, finds the address of Node O from its configuration file and
sends an initial hello message letting Node O know that it is up and
operational.
5) Node O responds to the hello message with a hello ACK message, and adds
Node 2 to its known list of neighbors. Upon receiving the ACK message,
Node 2 adds Node O to its list of known neighbors.
6) Node O then sends an introduce message to Node 2 letting it know that Node 1
is up and functioning as a sensor node.
7) After receiving the introduction message Node 2 sends a hello message to
Node I letting it know of its existence.
8) Node 1 sends a_ hello ACK message to Node 2 and adds Node 2 to its list of
known neighbors. Upon receiving the hello ACK message, Node 2 adds Node
1 to its known list of neighbors.
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9) After some time has passed and operations have been done, Node 1 issues a
goodbye message to Node O and Node 2 letting it know that it is going offiine
and to remove it from their neighbor list.
10) After some time has passed, Node 2 sends a goodbye message to Node 0
letting it know that it is going oftline and to remove it from its neighbor list.

With the hello and introduction messages, nodes are able to be informed of, and establish
communication with other nodes, expanding the network area covered by the sensor
fused system. The more neighbors that are present, the more likely a good decision will
be arrived upon by the sensor fusion methods. It also allows for more options when
defensive measures are called for.
Another important message sequence is the validation message sequence. This
sequence can be seen in figure 2.3 below.

1 Validation Messa e

Node 1

. Node O

Figure 2.3: Node Validation Message Sequence
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The validation sequence can be summarized by the following sequence:
1) Node O creates a 32-bit random number for the session. In future
implementations this could be encrypted using the public key for Node 1 that
was acquired in the initial hello message sequence. This number is then sent to
Node 1 using a validation message.
2) Node 1 then retransmits the random session number back in a validation ACK
message. Again, in the future Node 1 could first decrypt the message, then re
encrypt it using Node O's public encryption key before sending it back. Upon
receiving the validation ACK message, Node O then compares the number
returned to the one that was sent originally. If these numbers match, then
Node O considers Node 1 to be a valid neighbor.

This process would then be repeated in the other direction by Node 1. As the network
expands, each new neighbor would be validated by all other neighbors. This would help
improve the level of trust for the nodes and boost confidence in future requests for
observations such as packet record queries and defensive measure requests. Validation is
needed so nodes don't blindly accept requests· froin . possibly suspicious . neighbors.
Imagine the scenario without validation where an attacker streams requests to nodes
asking that they start blocking packets from their own domain name service (DNS) hosts.
This would result in a form of denial-of-service (DoS) attack for those victim nodes since
they would be unable to resolve hostnames into the corr·esponding IP addresses.
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Figure 2.4: Search Message Sequence

Figure 2.4 shows the next sequence in the discussion, the search message sequence. This
sequence allows nodes to perform queries to known nodes about weather or not they have
seen packets from a certain source. The steps of this sequence are:
1) Node O has determines it needs to query neighbors about a given address. It
then sends a search message to each of its known neighbors. The initial
thought of this protocol is that this need would arise from the detection of an
attack directed at Node 0. Future implementations may use this message
sequence to perform network audits or other forms of security procedures.
2) The neighboring nodes then respond with search ACK packets stating weather
or not they have seen the packet. These responses are then fused in some
manner by Node O for further decisions.
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The queries and responses generated by the search message sequence constitute
most of the expected traffic from the protocol. Talcing the IP, UDP, and SFNSP
payloads into account, each message introduces 44-bytes to the Ethernet link
layer. Therefore, the network traffic in bytes, N, generated would be:

N = 44 * n
Where n is the number of known neighbors. Using this message format, it would
take approximately 142 neighbors to use . an appreciable (5%) amount of the
bandwidth present in a l OBaseT Eth�et LAN.

This· also is based on the

assumption that the messages would be sent out in a second, which may be
unreasonable for some implementations of the protocol. Thus, the small nature of
the packets introduces very small additional system usage, 5kbps in the given
example of 142 neighbors. Although the example shows the search request
sequence being initiated by Node 0, it can be initiated by any of the nodes in the
network. This. flexibility allows each of the participating nodes to act as a
collector for the query responses and thus help drive the defense countermeasures
of the whole collective of nodes.

The last message sequence to be discussed is the block message sequence.

Node

o

Node · 1

Figure 2.5: Block Message Sequence
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Figure 2.5 shows the block message sequence. This sequence of messages allows nodes
to request that neighbors block attackers by adding their address to the firewall to be
dropped. It can be described by the following steps:
1) Node O receives responses from search queries and produces a fused result
suggesting that Node 1 is the most appropriate host to block the attacker, and
thus sends a block request message to Node 1.
2) Node 1 then determines how it will comply with the block request, and does
so to the best of its ability. It then formulates a response and notifies Node 0
of its results. · In the proof-of-conc.ept · application, the response was to do a
system call and have the address of the attacker added to the firewall, thus
eliminating a path of travel for the attacking stream. Future implementations
might choose to have Node 1 only limit the traffic, or otherwise modify the
firewall to their liking.

Like the others, this message sequence can be initiated by any of the nodes in the
collective, and be directed towards any of its· known neighbors that are present. This
proves to be most effective when a host at the edge of the network closesf to the attacker,
a sentinel of sorts, is part of the collection of participating sensors. This is because when
this sentinel is queried, it will respond that it has seen the packet in question. The
application is then able to fuse the responses and find that the sentinel host is the best
choice for the block request and submit the attacker address to be blocked. If the sentinel
host does in fact block all traffic from the attacking host, the rest of the network beyond
the sentinel will be protected from further attacks from the same host.
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CHAPTER 3
Protocol Implementation

Using the messages that were defined in the previous chapters, a program is
designed to implement the actions and sequences utilizing those message structures. This
application serves as a proof-of-concept for the protocol by implementing the messages
in such a way as to be able to perform the following tasks:
1) Alert the neighboring nodes of its entrance into, presence on, and egress from
the sensor network by use of the hello and goodbye messages.
2) Inform new neighbors of the presence of existing neighbors beyond the
immediate network scope via the introduce messages.
3) Perform queries of neighboring nodes for suspicious packets with the search
messages and respond to such queries.
4) Perform requests for blocking to the neighboring nodes, as well as perform the
blocking action and formulate a response, all by use of the block messages.

By being able to perform these actions, the application shows that the protocol serves as a
good tool for helping counter network attacks.
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3.1 Operating System Considerations
An initial task for any software design is to choose what operating system
platform is best for the application. For this program, an operating system with both a
customizable intrusion detection system, as well as a run-time configurable firewall is
needed.

RedHat Linux is utilized because it has components that fulfill these

requirements. The intrusion detection systems that have been introduced for Linux are
modular with customizable output, and the firewalling mechanism was easy to modify
though system calls. The intrusion . detection system that is utilized by this program is
Snort. This is because Snort is able to quickly generate alert events and log them to an
alert file for later processing by our application. Another good feature of using Snort is
that it is a rules based system. This allows us to update and modify the rules for
matching the attack forms, thus allowing for fine-tuning of the sensitivity of the system.
The second main component, the firewall, is iptables. This program is the standard
firewalling application for RedHat Linux running Kernel 2.4 and later, and relies on a
series of process chains to either admit, deny, or re-route packets. The fact that it was an
included part of the operating system meant that it could be made readily available on
many systems. The fact that on many systems, both of these components can be installed
and tuned to the exact network needs prior to any interaction from our application means
that these subsystems are stable and trustworthy before any interaction by our
application.
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3.2 Program Data Management
Two main issues drive how the program is designed and implemented. One, the
need to perform multiple procedures simultaneously, and two the need_ for proper data
storage of the elements required for the proper operation of the protocol.
For this application to work within the needs of the protocol it is required to do
several actions at the same time, this means that the program is multithreaded. Each
thread is designed to handle one task required for the function. These threads will be
explained in more detail in section 3.3.
The second factor is how to handle the various data products needed in order for
the application to satisfy the protocol. There choice of data structures are governed by
the need to store the packets that were seen on the network interface, maintain a record of
the known neighbors, and keep reference to the outstanding requests made to neighbors.
In order to store the packets a structure called PacketLog is defined. It is created
by using the· Standard Template Library (STL) Map structure. This structure allows us to
define an index (a key), and store an associated value with that key. For this application
the key for the Pac�etLog, is the string resulting from the concatenation
of the source and · ·
.
.

.

.

.

.

destination addresses, in network byte order, of the packet. Under that key, the program
stores when it saw _ the packet using the time function. For example, if a pac�et from
1 92. 1 68.0.25 were going to 1 92. 1 68.0.22, the key would be generated by converting the
source and target to their respective network byte order form, 4 1 9473600369141952, and
the value stored would be the result of the time call. Each time the application sees a
packet with the same source and destination address, the value stored at that key is
updated with the current time call. The reason that a Map type storage container is used
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in this instance is that it allows for constant time access of the information from
anywhere in the structure, which speeds up the response process by eliminating the need
to search for the right data.
In order for a node to maintain a list of its neighbors, the Neighbors data structure
is defined. It is generated by using a STL Vector container class consisting of Neighbor
objects. A Vector type container is used because it is easily progressed through, which is
needed for sending the messages to all neighbors. The Neighbor objects store pertinent
information about the neighbor such as the IP of the neighbor, if the neighbor has been
validated or not, how many attempts have been made to validate the neighbor, and the
range to the neighbor. The range to the neighbor comes from assuming a constant TTL
that is assigned to the packets by the application. As packets pass through routers and
hosts, this TTL is decremented. Once the TTL field reaches zero, the packet is dropped.
This mechanism helps control the number of neighbors a node could acquire. The range
value is found by taking the known value, and subtracting the TTL found when the
packet arrives. This data could prove useful as a secondary form of authentication, or act
as a coefficient in fusion processes.
A structure called ActionQue is introduced_ to maintain a record of outstanding
action requests for a given alert. The ActionQue is implemented by means of the STL
Deque data structure composed of elements of Action objects. The Deque structure is the
best choice because it has constant response times for adding and deleting items from
both the beginning and the end of the sequence. This kind of behavior is needed because
newer Actions could are added to the end of the sequence as attacks are detected, and as
messages are received from the neighbors the older Actions are removed from the front of
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the structure. The Action object holds the essential data about an attack and how it is
being handled by the system. · The data present in the Action object is:
1) Attacker address and port.
2) Victim address and port.
3) Time of the attack.
4) Addresses of the neighbors to whom queries were sent.
5) Booleans to keep track of which neighbors have sent responses to the queries.
6) The index of the neighbor to whom the block message was sent.
7) A ;Boolean indicating if a response has been received from the blocking
neighbor.
8) The response (0 or 65535) from the neighbor to the block message.

Action objects are added to the ActionQue by the guard thread, which will be described in

section 3 .3. The data elements are modified and updated as search and bloc� messages
are sent and received by the node and processed. Items are removed by the que when
they either time out after sixty seconds, or a host responds to a block request confirming
that it was able to add the attacking address to the firewall. Figure 3. 1 is a data flow
diagram of the application. The ActionQue icon appears twice on the diagram so as not to
mangle the data flow lines, they are the same object in reality. The. function blocks, other
than the 1.0 function, are· all handled by separate threads, which will be described in
section 3.3.
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Figure 3 . 1 Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of the proof-of-concept application.
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3.3 Multithreaded Process Handling
For the system to be able to handle the various tasks simultaneously, it needs to be
multithreaded. This allows the application to multi-task while still being able to share the
same global variables.

This ability allows the application to simultaneously record

packets, process incoming messages, monitor for new alerts, validate neighboring nodes
as they come online, and perform fusion processes as the responses from neighbors
accumulate. Each of these actions is represented by a function block (2.0 - 6:0) in the
DFD presented in figure 3.1 and are described in more detail below.
Record Thread
The record thread utilizes the libpcap (version 0. 7 .1) packet capture library to
monitor and record all the traffic on the eth0 Ethernet connection of the host. It is
responsible for adding to and pruning down the PacketLog data structure. It will
remove the oldest packets ·seen to keep the PacketLog under a given tlµ-eshold that
is set by the configuration file. This pruning process helps keep the memory use
down by removing packets that are most likely not to be queried for since they are
ol�er. The threshold utilized by this thread can be adjusted to meet the specific
traffic conditions present on the given host.
· Guard Thread
This thread monitors the alert file generated by Snort, /var/log/snort/alert, every
ten seconds. It watches for any additions to the file, and from those additions it creates
an Action object for the specific attack and sends a search message containing the
attacker's address, which it sends to the neighbors. The index field of the search message
is set to be the index of the current Action object within the ActionQue. The Action object
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is also modified to record which hosts received the request so that the responses coming
back can be processed and correlated.
Validate Thread
This thread waits for the addition of a neighbor to the Neighbors vector. It then
generates a unique random 32-bit number that it' then sends via a stream of validation
messages to the new neighbor.
Process Request Thread
This thread handles all of the incoming message processing and the acknowledge
messages. This thread first decomposes the incoming packet, and notes if the sending
source is known and validated. It then uses a case statement to process the message
based on the action and mode fields. If a hello �essage is received, the neighbor is
replied to by a hello acknowledge message, sent a list of known neighbors by means of
introduce messages, and added to the Neighbors structure if it is unknown. If a hello
acknowledge message is received, the neighbor is added to our Neighbors structure if it is
not known. The neighbors are only added to the· Neighbors structure if they are not
known because some nodes may be ungracefully . shut down without sending a goodbye
message. Failure to do this would result in having the same host in Neighbors twice,
which could cause complications. If an introduce message is received from a neighbor,
the receiving node will send a hello message to the neighbor being introduced in the
message if the neighbor is not already known. If a validation message is received from a
�own neighbo�, a validation acknowledge message is sent in reply with the validation
number echoed from the incoming message. If a validation acknowledge message is
received from a known host, the number present is compared to the number sent. If the
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two numbers a match, the neighbor is considered validated, and a flag is set as such in the
record for the neighbor in the Neighbors structure. When a search request message is
received from a known, validated neighbor, a key is generated using the IP of the sending
node and the address present if the search message. This key is then checked against the
PacketLog. If a packet matching the key is found, a time of recording (TOR) is returned,
if the key is not found, the check returns a zero.

If a TOR is returned, a search

acknowledge message is sent to the requesting node with the resultant field set to 65535,
otherwise the resultant field is set. to zero. The index fielq of �e :acknowledge i:nessage ·is ·
the same as the search request message. When a search acknowledge message is
received, the index field is used to quickly associate the message to the Action object to
which the response pertains in the ActionQue.

The arrival of a block message is seen

from a known neighbor that has been validated, a · system call is performed to add the
attacker address presented to ·be blocked by the firewall via iptables. When the system
call returns, the return code is then sent as the resultant in a block acknowledge message
back to the requesting neighbor. When a goodbye message is received, and the node is
known and validated, the node will be removed from the Neighbors structure.
Vote Thread
The vote thread handles the fusion process and sends the block messages to
neighbors. The voting cycle is triggered by either the elapse of ten_ seconds, or by
receiving a search acknowledge or block acknowledge message. Each of the Action items
in the ActionQue is processed in tum during each voting cycle. Each element is first
checked to see if all the recipients for _the Action item have responded, if any of the
recipients have not responded, the n·ext item in the ActionQue is processed. This is to
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allow the neighbor nodes time to respond.· The ten-second delay is present to trigger a
vote in the event that not all hosts respond to the search or block messages. If no
neighbors received the message, the host acts in self-defense by adding the attacker's
address to its own firewall. The . proof-of-concept application uses a very simple fusion
process based �n the following equations.

E = RnP
PeR

S = Emax range

Where R is the set of hosts that reply to the search message, P is the set of hosts that
respond with a positive that they have seen the packet destined for the victim host from
the attacking host. S is the host that that has the maximum range ·value associated with it.
This process ensures that the host closest to the attacker, S, is selected as the first host
that we select to block the packet. Once the best host is ·determined, the host is asked to
block the address of the attacker by means of the block message. If the Action item notes
that the furthest host has· been notified, but could not positively respond to the request to
block the attacker, the second furthest host is then coi:itact� in effort to block the
attacker. In the event that all hosts between the victim node and the attacker are unable to
block the attack, the node will default to a self-defense effort as noted above. The vote
thread also cleans up the Action items that either have been fulfilled (by receiving a
positive response from a blocking request) or have been around for more than sixty
seconds. This process helps keep memory, usage down for the application.
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3.4 Testing the Application
In order to test the performance of the applicati�n, a simple test bed is used. This
test bed allowed several scenarios to be observed.
External to Internal Attacks
These attacks are originally generated beyond the network gateway and target
machines on the local area network {LAN 1 and LAN 2).
Internal to Internal Attacks
These attacks· originate within one of the internal LANs and target hosts within
the confines of the gateway host.
Internal to External Attacks
These attacks originate from one of the hosts on the LANs and target machines
beyond the network gateway.

Figure 3.2 Test Network Topography
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Figure 3.2 shows the network configuration used for the testing. The gateway has
three network cards installed: eth0, eth l , and eth2. Eth0 is the external connection to the
Internet. All packets entering the LANs pass through this connection and are recorded by
the application in the PacketLog. Ethl and eth2 of the gateway are connected to LAN 1
and LAN 2 respectively. All nodes are running various versions of RedHat Linux.
Nodes O through 3 are running RedHat Linux version 7.2, and Nodes 4 and 5 are running
RedHat Linux 7.3. As it turned out the version of Linux had little to do with the results
of the tests. All tests were conducted with the nodes running the most current version of
Snort available at test time, 1 .8.7. The rules file used for testing is was the one packaged
in the RPM. The version of the rules had no real bearing on the test results because the
purpose of the tests was to see the response behavior of the application and the protocol,
not the effectiveness of the ID system. The fact that the application is independent of the
rule set used shows that as the effectiveness of Snort improves, so will the performance
of the system. All systems were running version 1 .2.5 of iptables for the tests. All nodes
were configured to have a tight firewall policy, only allowing for SSH, DNS, ICMP, and
port 9090 as incoming traffic. There were additional screening rules added to the
gateway to limit the traffic from noisy network sources. The firewalls allowed any
outward-bound packets to be sent. The gateway was also configured to allow for NAT to
allow the interior hosts to see, and be seen from the Internet.
For each of the tests, the application was started on Node 0 first. Then each of the
other nodes were started and informed of the neighboring nodes by Node 0 until each
node had all other nodes in their Neighbors list. Each attack was actually an NMAP scan
that caused Snort to flag the activity and cause an alert to be added to · the
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/var/log/snort/alert file. The application on the host would then process the addition via

the guard thread, and generate the requests to the neighbors.
· For the ·internal to external, and external to internal attacks the test network
performed as expected. The attack and response process for an external to internal attack,
from Node 5 to Node 1 for instance, is as follows.
1) Node 5 uses NMAP to try to probe the ports of Node 2.
2) Snort on Node 2 matches the structure of the packet to one of its rules, and
logs the attack to the alert file.
3) The guard thread cycles and finds that new items have been added to the alert
file. It then parses these new items and creates an Action object for ·each
attacking host.
4) The guard thread then sends �earch messages to all the other known nodes.
5) Nodes 2, 3, and 4 respond with a "no", because they never saw the packet on
their ethO. Nodes 0, and 5 respond with a ''yes" that they have seen the
packet.
6) The vote thread then fuses the responses, and concludes that Node 5 would be
the best host to ask to block since it is the closest to.the source (in this case, it
is the source).
7) Node 5 gets the request to block the IP, but since the IP to be blocked is its
own, as a safeguard it responds negatively to the request.
8) Node 1 receives the negative response and then asks Node O to block the IP.
9) Node O then gets the request and uses iptables to add the address of Node 5 to
the firewall and thus blocking the path for it to Node 1.
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A similar sequence is seen when testing the internal to external attack scenario, but with
Node O blocking packets from Node 1 .
A strange thing happened however when testing for internal to internal attacks.
For the case of Node 1 attacking Node _ 4, the packet is never seen on the ethO device of
Node 0. Thus, the only two nodes that see the offending packet are the attacker and the
victim, and since the attacker isn't asked to block their own traffic, this leaves self
defense as the only option for the victim.
The response time for all these scenarios is very fast due to the small message
structure and negligible network load present on the internal LANs. Nevertheless, a
possible worst case scenario can be envisioned if this application were to be deployed in
a large-scale setting. The worst response time that one could expect can be found by the
following equation:
T = l O + l O * (P - l) + l + 8

Where T is the total time in seconds, and P is the number of neighbors that responded
positively to the search request message, lambda is the cumulative time needed to process
the Action items that occur before the on in question in the ActionQue, and delta is the
amount of time needed for the system_ to take self-defense measures and is very small.
The initial ten comes from if the attack falls at the very beginning of the guard thread
monitoring cycle. Th� multiple of ten comes from the amount of time before the voting
thread would start another evaluation cycle.
As another test, the nodes were left running for an extended amount of time to see
how it would respond to real world_ attacks from the Internet. The only difference
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between this live fire test and the prescribed scenario is that some hosts were added to the
firewall of Node O · several times. This was because some attackers were using probe .
programs to sweep the entire subnet simultaneously, thus causing alerts to be triggered on
all the nodes of the internal system. This in turn caused Node O to add the attacking
address to the firewall multiple times.
Overall, the given scenarios, even as limited as they are, were able to test all the
aspects of · the protocol. The nodes were able to integrate themselves into a sensory
network, exchange messages concerning possible attack packets, fuse the . results, �d
execute defensive measures. This was the intent and motivation for the creation of the
application. However, this application is quite limited_ in several respects, and chapter 4
will discuss some possible improvements in the implementation, and expansions for the
protocol.
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusions and Future Research Directions
4.1 Future Research Directions
Through the development and testing of this architecture and protocol, several
deficiencies were noticed that should be addressed in future revisions. Several possible
problems with the proof-of-concept application were also identified · in development and
testing.
One main problem that was noticed during development of the application was
the problem of having a large number of neighbors and having a single thread to handle
both incoming and outgoing messages. This is not a problem with the simple test
network used for testing and development of the current application, but in the case of
wide scale deployment, a hosts network buffer could possibly dump some responding
packets if the traffic load into the host was high. This would result in missing responses
from some of the nodes. A way to fix this problem would be to hav� the application
spawn a separate thread when it is sending messages. This would free up the process
request thread to handle messages as they arrive at the host.
The fact that the entire discovery process is based on the existence of Node O is
another problem with the implementation. This could be solved by using broadcast
techniques, but that would in tum cause the problem of additional bandwidth usage. This
usage would drop back to the lower level once a single neighbor was found and the
introduction process could take place· between the nodes. Another solution that is viable
in a large scale implementation, is to have a system similar to DNS for nodal discovery.
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The nodes would come online, and look to these services to find what · neighbors were
closest, and then begin dialog with those neighbors.
The fact that packets are only recorded on eth0 is another limitation of the
application. Future revisions could record the traffic seen on the other network adapters
by either customizing the kernel so that all adapters could be read, or by multithreading
the recording process spawning one thread for each adapter.
Another problem is the simplicity of the fusion process. While it works for the
given application, methods that are more robust could be employed to improve the
performance and scalability of the system [ 17, 18]. These improvements would make the
system more reliable and improve the value of the observations to the decision process.
The range to the neighbors is one metric that could be used and is present, but unutilized
in the present implementation.
The severity of the. defensive measures is also another possible issue. Some
systems, such as internal networks, would be better served by alerting the administrator ·
that the attack was occurring, so that they could go to the malicious host and find the root
of the problem. Other problems such as route blocking and limiting could occur if the
traffic was completely blocked. �e solution to

this problem ·would be to introduce rules

that would limit the number of packets per second from a host, which would help in
streaming attacks. Another solution would be to provide some . mechanism for whi,ch a
node could remove rules from the firewall after a given amount of time has passed. This
time could be related to the severity of the attack initially blocked.
Future revisions of the protocol could provide messages that could do warning, or
request that other forms _of ID such as file forensics be performed -and results be returned
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to a node. By use of _a warning message, nodes could monitor for potentially hazardous
traffic and increase the state of alert for its neighbors. The additional file forensics could
provide another basis of measures that could be fed into the sensor fusion process as well
as track latent attacks to their source.

4.2 Conclusions
In this thesis,. I presented a system architecture and its associated protocol
designed to be used for fusing the output from intrusion detection systems on different
hosts on a network. Also presented was an applica�ion implementing that protocol and
architecture. The protocol was designed to be very flexible with sixteen possible actions
with four modes each. Six of these actions were presented in this initial draft of the
protocol and provided the mechanism for the core behavior of the protocol. These
messages allow nodes to insert themselves into the sensor network of neighbors, inform
new neighbors of the presence of existing nodes, validate neighbors, perform queries
between neighbors, request defensive action from neighbors, and remove nodes to
remove themselves from the sensory network. The application developed implements
these core actions and is successful at blocking the route of communication for attackers.
This application also introduces very little additional network traffic by implementing the
small packet structure that was set forth in the protocol definition. The application also
implements the protocol in such a way as to utilize the security aspects of the protocol.
Under several test situations, the application was able to block attacks that passed
through the primary Ethernet adapter of the gateway host validating the protocol. · But the
tests also shows some of the deficiencies of the current implementation, namely the
inability to recognize attacks that pass through interfaces other than ethO.
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Overall, _ I feel that this system architecture succeeds in meeting all the initial
design requirements and helps progress the development of sensor fused ID systems.
Future revisions could both refine and expand the aspects and scope of the protocol.
Different implementations of the protocol will allow for a increasingly flexible and
secure network which, one day, may allow networks to fully operate in a cooperative
defense making it more difficult for networks to be attacked.
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